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Abstract
Cryptographic primitives are essential for constructing privacy-pre-
serving communication mechanisms. There are situations in which two
parties that do not know each other need to exchange sensitive infor-
mation on the Internet. Trust management mechanisms make use of
digital credentials and certificates in order to establish trust among
these strangers. We address the problem of choosing which credentials
are exchanged. During this process, each party should learn no in-
formation about the preferences of the other party other than strictly
required for trust establishment. We present a method to reach an
agreement on the credentials to be exchanged that preserves the pri-
vacy of the parties. Our method is based on secure two-party com-
putation protocols for set intersection. Namely, it is constructed from
private matching schemes.
Keywords: Trust Management; Secure Two-Party Computation; Set
Intersection; Privacy-Preserving Data Mining.
1 Introduction
Interactions between parties that involve exchanging sensitive information
are part of everyday life. Taking a medical test, paying with a credit card
or asking for directions are examples of such interactions. In all of these
cases an individual or organization C reveals some information to another
individual or organization S so that S can provide a service to C. Clearly,
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an exchange of personal information is more likely to take place if there is
trust between the interacting parties. For instance, people agree on revealing
medical data to a doctor in a medical center, but not to anyone or anywhere.
These interactions are easy to carry out face to face and in a specific context,
but they are challenging if performed over the Internet, where personal
identification is not obvious and the physical context is simply not there.
A first approach is securing the communication using cryptographic pro-
tocols. Using these techniques in combination with public key infrastruc-
tures provides users interacting with remote parties with the certainty that
they are communicating with the real service provider. Furthermore, en-
crypting communication prevents third parties from eavesdropping on the
transmitted contents. This has been the basis of secure digital communi-
cations and e-commerce, but recent reports show that authentication is not
always enough for users to trust service providers [23, 30].
Therefore, there is a need to design new access control systems in which
not only the identity of the parties is revealed and assured, but trust is
built through the exchange of valid credentials that contain attributes of the
parties. Trust management mechanisms make use of digital credentials and
certificates in order to establish trust among strangers. Trust negotiation
schemes are protocols for establishing trust between parties unknown to
each other through the exchange of credentials and personal information; in
such negotiation protocols, the disclosure of this information is performed
according to access control policies determined by the parties.
1.1 Motivation
The special Eurobarometer on data protection and electronic identity [30]
shows some interesting results regarding the perception of privacy by cit-
izens of the European Union. Specifically, 74% of the Europeans see the
disclosure of personal information as a part of modern life. The main reason
for disclosure is to access online services, although 43% of the respondents
claim they have been asked for more personal information than necessary in
order to access these services. Finally, the report shows that a majority of
Europeans are concerned about their behavior being recorded via payment
cards, mobile phones or mobile Internet.
Trust management is treated as a building block of many commercial
frameworks. One example is the Interoperable Trust Assurance Infras-
tructure (Inter-Trust) [17]. It is a project that seeks to develop a frame-
work to support trustworthy applications in heterogeneous networks and
devices based on the enforcement of interoperable and changing security
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Figure 1: Interoperable Trust Assurance Infrastructure
policies (Figure 1). In Inter-Trust, the trust negotiation is essential to reach
agreements on the security policies, the so-called Service Level Agreements.
Inter-Trust will incorporate trustworthiness by integrating legal, social and
economic concerns, allowing applications and devices to negotiate and be
constrained by them.
1.2 Privacy-Preserving Trust Management
A critical issue in trust management is to preserve the privacy of the users.
During a trust management process, the parties can try to learn information
about each other. On the one hand, the parties can try to obtain information
about the preferences of the service providers. The requester of a service can
ask for different options to access the service. Then the server must provide
the different acceptable options. Since the revealed options may reflect the
business model and the target customers considered by the provider, service
providers are reluctant to show a full description of their access policy.
On the other hand, requesters do not want to provide information on the
credentials they own unless those credentials are essential for the transaction.
Clients are willing to show a credential if needed for accessing a service,
otherwise they will withhold it in order to preserve their privacy. Further,
each requester has a specific access control policy for each credential. That
is, a requester will show a credential only if the service provider gives enough
evidences of fairness.
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In summary, service providers are reluctant to show their access poli-
cies, and clients want to disclose as little private information as possible.
Therefore, during the trust management process each party should learn
no information about the access policies or preferences of the other parties
beyond what is strictly required for trust establishment. Solutions based
on trust negotiation mechanisms [8, 12, 19, 20, 21, 27, 31, 34] control the
disclosure of user preferences by showing the access control policies in a
sequential way. However, trust negotiation mechanisms are oriented to con-
trolling credential disclosure, and the users may obtain information on the
access control policies by playing with the system. Trust management mech-
anisms based on secure multiparty computation [24, 26, 38] provide higher
privacy protection.
1.3 Our Results
We address the problem of constructing a privacy-preserving mechanism
for choosing the credentials to be exchanged. Moreover, we consider that
privacy preservation should be achieved as effortlessly as possible. Therefore,
our goal is to come up with an efficient and privacy-preserving mechanism
to determine the optimal set of informations to be disclosed, according to
the preferences of the two parties. The exchange of credentials and the
final applications are beyond the scope of this work, which focuses on trust
management.
We present a method to reach an agreement on the credentials to be
exchanged that preserves the privacy of the parties. We consider the two-
party case, in which one party is a client that wants to access a service,
and the other party is the server that provides it. Our method is based on
secure two-party computation protocols for set intersection. Specifically, it
is constructed from the private matching schemes in [13].
The client sends a list of options to the server in a private way. Each
option is a combination of credentials the client would agree to show. The
server has a correspondence list that, for each accepted combination of client
credentials, specifies the credentials the server would show. Using secure
multiparty computation techniques, client and server compute the matching
options. Then the server sends to the client the options that match the
client’s preferences. In this way, the server does not learn the preferences of
the client, and the client only learns the specific access policies that match
her selected options.
The secure two-party computation primitive we use is based on homo-
morphic encryption. Using the Paillier cryptosystem [29], the total number
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of exponentiations needed is O(s + t ln ln s), where s and t are the number
of options specified by the client and the server, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an
introduction to trust management. Section 3 is devoted to secure multiparty
computation and to private matching schemes. We present our method in
Section 4. Section 5 lists conclusions and open problems.
2 Trust Management
Remote communications over the Internet often require the interacting par-
ties to trust each other, especially when the communication involves the
exchange of private, confidential, or sensitive information. Traditional ap-
proaches to establish trust assume that the parties are known to each other
before the communication takes place. Organizations often sign a Service
Level Agreement (SLA) and collaboration contracts before engaging in the
exchange of services and information. This approach is not always possi-
ble, because the assumption that the parties are known to each other is not
always true, especially in open environments such as the Internet and the
Web [34].
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and its successor Transport Layer Security
(TLS) are cryptographic protocols that provide trust and security to com-
munications over the Internet. These protocols begin with a negotiation or
handshake phase in which the two parties (normally a client and a server)
agree on an encryption algorithm and a shared key to encrypt the communi-
cation. Also, during this phase the two parties exchange digital certificates in
order to authenticate each other. Even though the use of TLS is widespread,
users do not fully trust Internet service providers, as discussed in the previ-
ous section. Therefore, there is a need to improve existing strategies and/or
devise new methods for establishing trust.
More recent approaches to establishing trust are the Automatic Trust
Negotiation (ATN) protocols. ATN is based on the exchange of digitally
signed credentials to establish trust and make access control decisions. Dig-
ital credentials are an extension of traditional electronic certificates that only
prove the identity of a user. Credentials can include additional attributes,
and hence they can certify more properties of that user, such as the age,
the permission to perform a certain activity, membership to a certain orga-
nization, etc. These credentials can be seen as an electronic version of the
physical credentials that everyone carries in their wallets [35].
Although introducing such additional attributes can play an important
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role in the establishment of trust, it is important to note that they can
represent sensitive information by themselves, and should only be shared
with other parties according to some access control policies. For example, a
user C might require some credentials from S that certify that S is a doctor
in order to share her medical history. In case S cannot deliver the required
credentials to the user C, the exchange of credentials will be interrupted and
the negotiation will fail.
Several tools and techniques have been presented to avoid such deadlock
situations, for instance [21, 22, 16, 32]. These tools can be classified into
cryptographic credentials, access control policies and negotiation techniques.
The rest of this section describes these three tool classes in more detail.
2.1 Electronic Credentials
As pointed out in [35], digital versions of the same credentials we carry
in our pockets should be enough to devise similar trust mechanisms over
the Internet as we normally do in everyday situations. Using Public Key
Infrastructures (PKI) and Trusted Third Parties (TTP), it is possible to
issue digital credentials that can be verified in a secure way.
With this in mind, X.509 certificates come as a reasonable tool to prove
identity and other properties about the user [36], and as such, they have
become the standard for authentication in the Internet. However, X.509
was not designed with privacy in mind. Li et al. [21] enumerated the prop-
erties a digital certificate should offer and the related cryptographic tools
for carrying out trust negotiations while preserving the privacy of the par-
ties. These properties are: separation of credential and attribute disclosure,
selective disclosure of attributes, oblivious use of credentials and attributes,
and zero-knowledge proofs and secure multiparty computation schemes to
compute and prove compliance with policies.
Oblivious Attribute Certificates (OACerts, [22]) are a good example of
a digital credential scheme that complies with these properties. OACerts
allow parties to use attribute values stored in the certificate in an oblivious
way. The attributes can be used to evaluate Boolean conditions in policies
without revealing the actual values. The oblivious use of credentials is also
studied in [11, 12, 16, 21].
2.2 Access Control Policies
Policies control the disclosure of attributes and credentials of the parties.
These policies range from the simple case of identification of the requester
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to more complex systems that involve users, roles and organizations with
different levels of permissions towards the offered resources.
Access control policies have been a topic of discussion in both industry
and academia. W3C and OASIS both have published a set of standards
that regulate several types of policies to control the access to and the use
of Web services. Of these the most popular one is probably the XML-based
XACML [9].
Other important examples of access control models are attribute-based
access control (ABAC), of which XACML is an example, discretional access
control (DAC), mandatory access control (MAC), role-based access control
(RBAC), organizational role-based access control (OrBAC) [28], etc.
2.3 Automated Trust Negotiation Systems
By adding some additional tools and mechanisms to the previously men-
tioned ones, a number of final systems have been developed. In this section
we present a few examples
TrustBuilder [20] is focused on trust negotiation and uses an ABAC
model. The TrustBuilder approach consists in sequentially disclosing cre-
dentials and policies in a controlled way, such that sensitive credentials and
policies are only disclosed once a certain level of trust is established. Policies
are only disclosed if they are relevant to the negotiation.
The TrustX framework [31] makes use of an XML-based language to
define credentials and policies. Parties using TrustX collectively build a
tree that represents all the possible ways in which the negotiation can take
place. A path from the root to a leaf that satisfies both parties is the
accepted negotiation process.
XeNA [15] is based on XACML and RBAC. The system sequentially
exchanges credentials to fulfill the conditions of the access control policies.
Credentials are classified by levels or classes of sensitivity. MoTOrBAC 2 [2]
is a security administration tool. It allows the specification and administra-
tion of OrBAC-based security policies. Finally, Idemix [4], allows creating
and managing anonymous credentials.
3 Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure multiparty computation allows a set of parties to compute a joint
function of their inputs in a secure way without requiring a trusted third
party. During the execution of the protocol the parties do not learn any-
thing about each other’s input except what is implied by the output itself.
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There are two main adversarial models: honest-but-curious adversaries and
malicious adversaries. In the former model, the players follow the protocol’s
instructions but try to obtain information about other players’ inputs from
the messages they receive. In the latter model, the adversary may deviate
from the protocol in an arbitrary way. Aumann and Lindell [1] introduced
a new model, the covert adversaries. A covert adversary may deviate from
the protocol in an attempt to cheat, but such deviations are detected by
honest parties. In this context, the parties may be considered rational, that
is, acting according to their interests. In game-theoretic terms, it is assumed
that players only try to maximize their utility functions; hence, all possible
deviations from the correct protocol execution have this goal.
This work is restricted to the two-party case and the setting in which
both parties have the same output. As to the type of computations to
be carried out, we only consider the set intersection function and other
combinatorial functions. For convenience, we will distinguish the role of the
two parties: one will be a client C and the other a server S.
The intersection of two sets can be obtained by using the generic con-
structions based on Yao’s garbled circuit [37]. This technique is very generic,
because it allows computing any arithmetic function, but for most of the
functions it is inefficient. Many of the recent works on two-party computa-
tion are focused on improving the efficiency of these protocols for particular
families of functions.
Freedman, Nissim, and Pinkas [13] presented a more efficient method
to compute the set intersection that uses polynomial-based techniques and
homomorphic encryption. Specifically, they presented a private matching
scheme, a two-party protocol that works as follows. First the client C and
the server S agree on a finite domain of elements D. Then C inputs X =
{a1, . . . , as} ⊆ D, S inputs Y = {b1, . . . , bt} ⊆ D, where s and t are known,
and finally C learns X ∩ Y . The scheme can be constructed by means of
the Paillier cryptosystem [29]. It exploits the property that given three
elements m1,m2,m3, it is possible to compute efficiently Enc(m1+m2) and
Enc(m1 ·m3) from Enc(m1), Enc(m2), and m3.
Next we present an outline of the scheme in [13] that is secure against
in the honest-but-curious model.
1. C computes the polynomial p(x) =
∏s
i=1(x− ai).
2. C sends Enc(p0), . . . , Enc(ps) to S, where pi is the coefficient of degree
i of p.
3. For every 1 ≤ j ≤ t, S picks a random element rj ∈ Zn and computes
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Enc(rj · p(bj) + bj). Observe that these ciphertexts can be obtained
from Enc(p0), . . . , Enc(ps) and Enc(bj) by using the homomorphic
properties of the cryptosystem. Then S sends the ciphertexts to C.
4. C decrypts the t ciphertexts. The result of each decryption is an ele-
ment from X ∩ Y or a random element.
If the size of the domain of Enc is much larger than |X| the scheme computes
X ∩ Y with high probability. There is a variant of this protocol that allows
adding an additional payload. Step 3 of the protocol described above is
replaced by the following one:
3’. S picks a random element rj ∈ Zn for every 1 ≤ j ≤ t. Let cj be
a payload data associated to bj that S wants to send to C. Then
S computes Enc(rj · p(bj) + (bj ||cj)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, and sends these
ciphertexts to C.
Observe that in this case, in the last step C decrypts the t ciphertexts and
obtains X ∩ Y and an additional information for each of these elements.
The idea of Freedman, Nissim, and Pinkas [13] was used in many other
works to improve the computation of set operations. Kissner and Song [18]
presented secure multiparty computation protocols for computing the set in-
tersection, multi-set intersection and other combinatorial operations. They
present constructions for honest-but-curious adversaries and malicious ad-
versaries. Hazay and Lindell [14] presented a construction that is secure
in the covert model. There are also other interesting constructions in the
literature, such as [5, 25].
4 A Privacy-Preserving Trust Management Scheme
In this section we present a new mechanism for privacy-preserving trust
management. The situation we consider is the following one. A client C
wants to buy a service from a server S. S needs some personal and financial
information about C to perform the transaction. However, C is reluctant to
show private information to S, because C is not sure that S trustworthy.
The mechanism we construct is a protocol based on the private matching
scheme presented in the previous section. Namely, the protocol with the
alternate step 3′. Hence our protocol is secure in the honest-but-curious
model. For the sake of completeness, we present herein all the details of our
proposal.
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Our proposal allows parties C and S to agree on the information they
have to exchange to perform the transaction in a private way. Broadly
speaking, C first sends an encrypted message to S that declares which cre-
dentials and personal information she would be inclined to reveal to S. S
cannot read the message, but he can create an encrypted message containing
the options declared by C in which he agrees, and the information S would
reveal in each case. The interest of the protocol lies in the protection of the
preferences of each party. That is, S does not learn the preferences of C, and
C only learns the specific access policies that match her selected options.
Let EC and ES be the domains of credentials and personal data of C and
S, respectively. Define DC = P(EC) and DS = P(ES). Notice that, for any
set A, P(A) is the family of subsets of A.
First C defines different combinations of elements from EC that she would
be ready to show to S. Let X = {a1, . . . , as} ⊆ DC be the set of such
options. Independently, S defines Y = {(b1, c1), . . . , (bt, ct)} ⊆ DC × DS ,
the acceptable combinations (bi, ci) ∈ DC ×DS according to his preferences.
That is, for every acceptable combination of elements bi from DC , S would
show ci ∈ DS . Observe that (bi, ci) 6= (bj , cj) for every 1 ≤ i < j ≤ s, but bi
and bj (or ci and cj) may be equal. Now we present our protocol.
1. C computes the polynomial p(x) =
∏s
i=1(x− ai).
2. C sends Enc(p0), . . . , Enc(ps) to S, where pi is the coefficient of degree
i of p.
3. For every 1 ≤ j ≤ t, S picks a random element rj ∈ Zn and computes
Enc(rj · p(bj) + (bj ||cj)). Then S sends the ciphertexts to C.
4. C decrypts the t ciphertexts.
The result of each decryption is an element from X attached to an element
of DS or a random element.
4.1 Discussion
As encryption method we can use the Paillier cryptosystem [29]. In this case,
we take n = p · q, where p and q are large primes satisfying the properties
in [29]. Then we describe X ∈ Zn and Y ⊆ Zn × Zn. A way to encode
an option in Zn is the following. First, we establish an order among the
credentials. Given an option {credi1 , credi2 , . . . , crediu} for some i1 < i2 <
. . . < iu, we consider x =
∑u
j=1 2
ij . If the domain DC (or DS) is much
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larger than the number of realistic options, we can use a hash function [13].
The amount of exponentiations needed is O(s · t), and it can be reduced to
O(s+ t ln ln s) [13].
The protocol is secure in the honest-but-curious adversary model. Fol-
lowing [13] we can create a protocol that is secure in the malicious adversary
model by means of zero-knowledge proofs. The resulting protocol is much
less efficient.
We consider that the previous solution is tailored according to the com-
mon client-server context in which the client is usually at a disadvantage.
It grants a higher protection to the privacy of the client than to the pri-
vacy of the server. However, there are other situations in which we need to
guarantee a more equitable treatment. In this case, private matchings also
provide a natural solution for privacy-preserving trust management. A solu-
tion would be a private matching in which the inputs contain the preferred
options about one’s own credentials and the other party’s credentials. That
is, X,Y ⊆ DC ×DS . A solution along this line was presented in [24].
In this work we present a method for agreeing on the credentials to be
exchanged, but we do not analyze the way the credentials are exchanged and
disclosed. There are many schemes for fair exchange of information between
different parties. Some recent proposals consider schemes that are secure in
the covert model, as for instance [3, 6, 7]. Most of these solutions model the
exchange of information as a static game with complete information, and
hence look for Nash equilibria.
5 Related Work
Secure multiparty computation protocols have been used as building blocks
to obtain privacy-preserving data mining techniques. Specifically, they can
be used for finding correlations and patterns among different attributes from
large relational databases. The protocols for set intersection are specially in-
teresting in data mining. For example, they allow two companies to discover
the amount of customers they share without having to reveal the entire lists
of their customers.
Yao et al. [38] presented Point-Based Trust, a trust management mech-
anism built from a tailored secure multiparty computation protocol. The
owner of a resource values each credential with an access threshold, a certain
number of points. This access threshold is the minimum amount of points
required by the owner from the client to give the latter access the resource.
The resource owner also defines a point value of each credential, which de-
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notes the number of points a client obtains if she discloses that credential.
The thresholds and the point values are not revealed by the owner to the
client. The output of the protocol provides a combination of the credentials
that allows the client to obtain access while minimizing her privacy loss.
This protocol is secure in the honest-but-curious adversarial model and uses
secure two-party protocols for computing the maximum of two values [10].
A drawback of this scheme is that the quantitative approach is not always
the most suitable. For instance, the national id, the passport, and the driv-
ing license are documents that provide a similar amount of trust and may
have a high weight. However, observe that the amount of trust obtained by
disclosing these credentials is not the sum of individual point values, because
there is a lot of redundant information between them. Moreover, there are
some informations that make sense only if they are presented at the same
time. For instance, the expiration date of a credit card is useless without
the credit card number.
In a privacy-reconciliation protocol [24, 26], each party holds a private
input set in which the elements are ordered according to the party’s prefer-
ences. The goal of a reconciliation protocol on these ordered sets is to find
all common elements in the parties’ input sets that maximize the joint pref-
erences of the parties. The main drawback of these schemes is the efficiency.
The computation of the best option is, in general, a hard problem and so
the protocols are less efficient than the scheme presented here. Adding pri-
vacy protection to reconciliation protocols can increase by two orders of
magnitude the running time of the reconciliation protocols [24, 33].
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a privacy-preserving mechanism for trust
management. This work is restricted to the two-party case. Given the pref-
erences of each party on credential disclosure, our method provides a pro-
posal on the credentials to be exchanged that is consistent with the parties’
preferences. The privacy of the parties is preserved because their prefer-
ences are protected by a protocol for secure multiparty computation for set
intersection that is secure in the honest-but-curious model.
Future work might consider the combination of this trust management
method with fair exchange mechanisms and the integration of these building
blocks into more general frameworks. Moreover, it would be interesting to
extend this construction to the covert adversarial model. That is, to find a
protocol secure in the rational model computing the same function.
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